#### Paulo Barroso

Instituto Politécnico de Viseu - pbarroso1062@gmail.com

### **Abstract**

Bacon's paintings are images-sensations, a figurative art that composes a visual rhetoric of pathos. It is a rhetoric of sensations centred on the effects of visual signs on the spectators/viewers. The pathos is something perceptive and sensitive that happens in the spectators/viewers; it is driven, incited, provoked by Bacon's images. The pathos is indistinctly caused by the intentional and strategic use of a visual language. The meanings of the visual signs are formed a priori and transmitted as clearly as possible in reference to a given situation, activity, event, reality/world. If this is so, the use of rhetoric is emphatic to explore the pathos instigated by Bacon's images-sensations. Following a theoretical and conceptual approach and through the lens of Deleuze's perspective, the aim is to show the power of visual rhetoric when provoking sensations, and to problematize the representation and report of reality as a changing process through signs/images. This is demonstrated by Bacon's images-sensations and Deleuze's transcendental empiricism perspective. In a semiotic perspective, Bacon's paintings are a perfect anchorage to understand the influence of an aesthetical language and practice of image as a visual rhetoric resource, which amplify the pathos.

**Keywords:** Bacon, image-sensation, *pathos*, sign, visual rhetoric.

# Pintando Sensações: Desvendando a Retórica Visual do *Pathos* nas Imagens de Bacon Através da Perspectiva do Empirismo Transcendental de Deleuze

#### Resumo

As pinturas de Bacon são imagens-sensações, uma arte figurativa que compõe uma retórica visual do pathos. É uma retórica de sensações centrada nos efeitos dos signos visuais sobre os espectadores/observadores. O pathos é algo perceptivo e sensível que acontece nos espectadores/observadores; é impulsionado, incitado, provocado pelas imagens de Bacon. O pathos é causado indistintamente pelo uso intencional e estratégico de uma linguagem visual. Os significados dos signos visuais são formados a priori e transmitidos da forma

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mais clara possível em referência a uma determinada situação, atividade, evento, realidade/mundo. Se assim é, o uso da retórica é enfático para explorar o *pathos* instigado pelas imagens-sensações de Bacon. Seguindo uma abordagem teórica e conceptual e através da perspectiva de Deleuze, pretende-se mostrar o poder da retórica visual na provocação de sensações e problematizar a representação e relato da realidade como um processo em

mudança através de signos/imagens. Isto é demonstrado pelas imagens-sensações de Bacon e pela perspectiva do empirismo transcendental de Deleuze. Numa perspectiva semiótica, as pinturas de Bacon são uma ancoragem perfeita para compreender a influência de uma linguagem estética e da prática da imagem como recurso retórico visual, que amplificam o *pathos*.

Palavras-chave: Bacon, imagem-sensação, pathos, retórica visual, signo.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The study of the sign, structures of meaning and modes of representation corresponds to the understanding of the daily processes of communication, but also the more complex, distortive, and abstract artistic forms of expression and visual language as the paintings of Francis Bacon (1909-1992). This article argues the subjacent sensitive experience the sign provokes, i.e. the practical effects of meaning. The article presents an anchorage: the images-sensations created by Bacon. These images are signs produced to provoke the *pathos*, an arousal of emotions, feelings, sensations. Bacon's images-sensations are more than simple images and images-signs that represent something. In the light of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, they are images that force the thought and experience; they are images-thoughts or images of thought.

This article intends to question and argue the representative function of Bacon's visual signs. It deals with the conception of reality grounded on the mere sensible effects of signs, i.e. the semiosis process unleashed by the presence and perception of signs and what they (virtually) mean and intend. The virtual is what is produced by signs, and it comes or is extracted from the real, in which it is incorporated. The virtual becomes indistinguishable from the reality, the image and the sensation caused by the image. Bacon's images-sensations demonstrate this indistinguishability. Thus, one remains in a shadow-zone of indistinction produced by appearances and simula-

tion. The virtuality of signs created by the excesses of images / signs, meanings and sensations describe how perception is formed by simulations and stimuli to think, feel, act, express and conceive reality.

Following a theoretical and conceptual approach, the purpose of this article is to argue the sign as a vehicle capable of undertaking a double and inherent understanding, that of language and that of human sensitive experience. The exercise of thought focuses on signs and their senses approaches us through the understanding and leads to indirect knowledge of existence. The reality becomes its representation, as an "absolute idealism" translated by Berkeley (1999, pp. 25-27) in the *Esse est percipi* principle.

# 2. DELEUZE AND THE LOGIC OF THE SENSATIONS IN BACON'S PAINTING

In *Logique du Sens*, Deleuze's analysis of Bacon's paintings focuses on how the art challenges conventional representations. On the contrary, Bacon's art creates a unique visual experience that Deleuze terms the "logic of sensation". Deleuze's interpretation of Bacon's paintings emphasizes the interplay of form, colour, and emotion to evoke intense sensations and affective responses. Deleuze observes that Bacon disrupts the traditional relationship between figures and backgrounds in his paintings. Instead of separating the depicted object from the space it occupies, Bacon melds them together, generating a sense of flow and continuity. This creates an intense and chaotic visual experience.

Another original aspect regarding Bacon's art is the transforming bodies. Deleuze notes that Bacon portrays bodies undergoing constant transformation and distortion. Human bodies in his paintings are often deformed, decomposed, or merged with their surroundings. This reflects the idea that bodies are dynamic processes rather than static entities.

But how are sensations triggered? Deleuze describes how Bacon crystallizes intense and complex sensations in his paintings. Rather than aiming for perfect resemblance to external reality, Bacon seeks to capture the emotional energy and internal turbulence of his subjects. He achieves this through rapid brushwork and expressive gestures. Deleuze emphasizes a sense of silent scream in Bacon's paintings. The images often evoke feelings of anguish and claustrophobia, where violence and emo-

tional intensity are contained and expressed through the very forms and colours of the painting. Deleuze views the canvas surface as a field of intensity, where colours and forms blend and interact to create a profound sensory experience. He argues that the painting's surface is not merely a space for representation but a space where sensation is activated.

Deleuze's analysis focuses on how Bacon's paintings create affective intensities that go beyond traditional representational art. He emphasizes the power of sensation and affect in Bacon's work, where the paintings convey emotions and experiences that are raw and immediate, rather than neatly structured or easily interpreted. The "logic of sensation" is about exploring the way Bacon's paintings provoke visceral reactions and engage viewers on a sensory and emotional level.

The excesses and strengths of Bacon's images is in the ability to directly and immediately puncture our sensations, as Barthes (1982, p. 27) calls *punctum*, the "something" in the photography that leads the spectators/viewers to have a stronger emotion for seeing the image. In *Logique du Sens*, Deleuze recognizes the specificity of the images produced by Bacon (the deformation of figures as a paradoxical *hypotýposis* of reality, i.e. a vivid and realistic description of a situation) as images-sensation in which the experience of sensation is recreated, making the relations represented/real, signs/things, concepts/percepts indiscernible. Only the sensations recreated by Bacon on his paintings provide an experience that is transcendental and virtual; an experience banned in the very experience of reality. It is due to this specificity of Bacon's images-sensations that Deleuze elects them as paradigms in the problematization of the duality lived/not lived, thought/unthought and thinkable/unthinkable, sayable/unspeakable, visible/invisible.

### 3. WHY BACON'S IMAGE-SENSATION?

Any sign fits into a structure of meaning and a mode of representation, triggering semantic transitions. Only through signs do we move (transit) from concepts to perception and then to the senses and meanings. This is a semantic transition. Bacon's paintings present visual signs that operate semantic transitions from the images themselves (as signs or any other sort of sign: shapes, colours, figures, lines) to sensations.

The anchorage on Bacon's paintings is ideal to understand the influence of visual language and practice of image as a visual rhetoric resource. The artist produces images that are potential in visual effects on the *pathos*. These images are more than works of art. Bacon intends to highlight the confrontation between reality and visual representation. He chooses impressive themes that heighten the spectators/viewers's sensation, causing excesses of perception and sensations.

Bacon creates images to put reality in evidence. This is a paradox, insofar as it is the image (the reproduction) that emphasizes the reality (what is reproduced). Bacon's images are characterized by the excesses of sensations they provoke, as they are an over-communication. Bacon is more interested about reality than the very fantasy he creates.

In the documentary series The South Bank Show, filmed and directed by David Hinton in 1985, Bacon justifies his style marked by the production of raw, disturbing images of violence and horror, addresses various aspects of his image practice and its implications, namely in the analogical relationship with reality and with the impressive effects it provokes in the public. During the conversation/interview with Melvyn Bragg, Bacon justifies his image practices through distorted forms of the figures and the themes of violence, horror and death of representations and artistic productions based on the referred themes of violence, horror, death, voluptuousness with the own images of reality and the media that reproduce reality. In response to the widespread opinion of people who view the violence, horror, blood, and dread in his paintings as shock rather than beautiful representation, Bacon responds: "What could I make to compete [with] what goes on every single day. If you read the newspapers, if you look at television, if you know what's going on in the world..." (Hinton, 1985). Bacon stresses he can do nothing to compete with the horror that's going on. "I have tried to make images of it, I have tried to recreate and make, not the horror, but [...] images of realism." (Hinton, 1985).

According to Bacon, when you look at his paintings, you are looking at the real world. "Between birth and death... it's always the same thing... the violence of life." (Hinton, 1985). Bacon considers his works images of sensation, since life really is sensation, which is why he recognizes that he is not interested in fantasy, only in reality. Artistic images reside in this transformative process in which a real thing becomes art. "I want to be able to remake in another medium the reality of an image that excites me." (Hinton, 1985).

Bacon's visual approach is intense, excessive, provocative of ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and understanding reality. Bacon provokes the *pathos* of the spectators through the signs he chooses to supplant his own perception of the real. That is why the concept of sign acts on Bacon's images. The sign is sensible, a vehicle for feeling and thinking. The sign is not defined by the signifier. Thinking involves a *pathos*, an involuntary activity triggered by the strength and violence of the sign.

## 4. DELEUZE'S TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM

Deleuze focuses on Bacon's paintings as images-sensations that make visible the excesses and forces of representation. According to Deleuze (2003a, p. 56), Bacon accomplishes this task of painting: to produce visual signs that push us out of our pattern of perception of reality and allow us to perceive what really exists imperceptibly, as if it were there without being there, as if it were virtual. It is the sign that forces thought as thought assumes itself as an involuntary, unconscious and transcendental exercise. Thus, at the genesis of the act of thinking is the violence of signs on a thought (Deleuze, 1968, p. 181; Deleuze 2003b, p. 15). The object of sensibility (the sensitive, what allows us to be felt) is intense and it resides in the sign.

For Deleuze, the act of thinking is provoked into thought when it is stimulated by signs. The classical model of representation based on the concept of sign, whose role is merely representational, is refuted. The sign thus differentiates thought from the act of thinking. It is the sign that forces us to think, and this force is translated into the violence of the sign in provoking the act of thinking as a possibility of creation (Deleuze, 2003b, p. 15).

In Deleuze's so-called transcendental empiricism, what is fundamental is the experience and conditions of real experience (and not of possible experience). The transcendental empiricism is the logic of sense and sensations in Bacon's paintings; it is the immanence of the experience given by Bacon's images-sensations.

The non-identity of the sign with itself is evident; the sign is double, i.e. sensible and intelligible. In *De Dialectica*, St. Augustine (1991, p. 48) states that a sign is "something that shows itself to the senses and also something else in the spirit (i.e. *signum est et quod seipsum sensui, et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit*). This is a classic semiotics assumption, stressing that we are aware of signs through the senses, experience, and that the sign always tells us something, reveals its content to our spirit.

Following this perspective about the sign, Ricoeur would add that the sign evokes, suggests, or gives a second meaning that opens and expands indefinitely through myth (word and *hermeneia*) and rite (action). The sign is defined and understood by its power of double meaning. The sign makes us think, calls for an interpretation, precisely because it says more than it doesn't say and because it never finished saying (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 29). As Ricoeur (2013, p. 373) points out, any symbol is ultimately a hierophany, a manifestation of the link between man and the sacred. It is as if signs contain the germ of all possible meanings, so that all our thoughts are destined to be spoken by them. The power of the sign is being able to compose and recompose all the meanings and the corresponding recognitions and understandings. This potency makes all thoughts destined to be spoken by language and by signs in general, like Bacon's images-sensations.

The virtual is already part of the sign. When a sign designates something absent that is meant, created, or formed in the mind as a representation of something, the sign produces something virtual. In the *Collected Papers*, Peirce (1978, § 6.372) defines the concept of virtual as "a virtual X (where X is a common name) is something, not an X, which has the efficiency (a *virtus*, virtue) of an X". This conception of X is based on the condition of representation, which is triggered by any process of meaning and which it is present both in virtualization and in the underlying relationship between the real and the unreal. Peirce states that the meaning of a thought is, in its entirety, something virtual. Thought does not reside in what is thought, but in what this thought can connect in representation with subsequent thoughts (Peirce, 1978, § 5.289).

The origin of the conception of reality reveals that it implies the notion of community (Peirce, 1978, § 5.311). Peirce's perspective on cognition is essentially based on an appeal to the collective (outside the individual and therefore knowable) and in a semiotic process (thoughts through signs). Peirce reinforces the importance of signs for the act of knowledge of reality or for the very formation of thought and representation of whatever it is through language. Thoughts are based on signs about reality and are knowable.

Peirce's conception of the sign is, therefore, triadic: "a sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (Peirce, 1978, § 2.228). The sign addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind an equivalent or a more developed sign. "That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign", explains Peirce (1978, § 2.228). The sign stands for something, its

object, in reference to a sort of idea, "which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen" (Peirce 1978, § 2.228).

Deleuze's perspective about Bacon's images-sensations is based on what he calls the apprehension of the thought of excessive differences in intensity and strength as an immanent transcendental principle. For this reason and in an ontological perspective, Bacon's images-sensations are ideal to demonstrate how the sense of being is expressed in the difference, as Deleuze reveals using the expression "logique de la sensation".

The transcendental empiricism means the discovery of the real experience, but not an ordinary one. The human faculty is driven to its limit. Philosophy achieves its aptitude rising itself to the transcendental. The concept of transcendence does not mean that the faculty is directed to objects outside the world. This would be the common sense of "transcendent". The empiricism becomes transcendental when we directly apprehend in the sensible what must be felt, the very being of the sensitive (Deleuze, 1968, p. 80). For Deleuze, the transcendental is separated from every idea of consciousness; it is an experience without either consciousness or subject.

Therefore, the ordinary human experiences may become transcendental if we overcome the images-sensations due to its excesses and forces, i.e. when the simple image and the deepest sensation contained in the image are connected. That's why Bacon's paintings are suitable for this process of overcoming and obtaining an excessive experience of the world.

Considering that a sensation is an immediate experience of direct contact with the world; any sensation is a "pure presence", an imprint of data about the world. Sensations and representations are different. Paintings are representations, signs, images about the world; sensations are unelaborated elementary awareness of stimulation or a general feeling of excitement and heightened interest about the world. Bacon's paintings are both representations and sensations about the world. Bacon repeatedly states that he tries to overcome the narrative, the identifiable and the mere figurative painting. What makes Bacon's art of painting so interesting, peculiar, and adequate to understand the excesses of sensation and over-communication is that his paintings are dealing with and are about a non-intentional relation to the spectator (Lotz, 2009, p. 63). Bacon's paintings provoke the spectator's *pathos*, allows the spectator to overcome the images-sensations due to its excesses and forces.

Deleuze's perspective on Bacon's images-sensations help us to understand the direct and factual effects of visual art on the human experience, taking Bacon's paint-

ings as examples. Better than anyone, Bacon designs paintings that show the connection between sensation and image. They are the images-sensations.

### 5. TOWARDS A VISUAL RHETORIC OF PATHOS

Rhetoric is a proficient use of language. It aims to influence how people think, feel, and act. Rhetoric is a set of regulated resources and means, insistent figures (Barthes, 1991, p. 151) which may appeal to rational (*logos*) or emotional (*pathos*) reactions.

In the rhetoric of pathos or rhetoric of sensations, the pathos means "something that happens" to bodies (qualities) and to souls (emotions), explains Peters (1967, 152). The perspective is that of *pathos* as something that happens indistinctly caused by the strategic use of (visual or non-visual) language. The rhetoric of sensations is the appeal to emotions, and it is evident in public discourses, like visual arts. The pathos is action and reaction or response; it is an expression of contingency, a susceptible psychological and emotional state. The pathos is a set of passions or emotions of the audience. "[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile." (Aristotle, 2004, 1356a). The importance of pathos is due to its volatile and provokable feature through the strategic use of certain signs. The nature of the *pathos* changes when emotional reactions occur and are provoked by stimuli or any appeal to emotion, namely fear. The second book of Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric* is entirely dedicated to the passions. However, passions left the field of rhetoric about two thousand years ago (Meyer, Carrilho & Timmermans, 1999, p. 6). The relevance of pathos is because it influences with a passional logic. Passions are obsessive, blind, irrational, illusory, and people only see what they want. The logic of the pathos is a logic of emotional reactions. Therefore, the rhetoric of sensations is based on rhetorical illusions applied and conveyed as believes by the speaker.

If rhetoric is the technique of the persuasive use of what is said through verbal signs, visual rhetoric is the same technique, but exploring visuality (what is shown through the image). Visual language is strategically explored by Bacon as a visual rhetoric, an art or technique of using visuality, what is shown in an adequate way to influence or provoke sensations. Bacon uses specific and peculiar rhetorical resources, distorting figures and choosing dark colours, creating a reality effect and assuming

a realism that characterizes them as *hypotýposis* of reality. The excess of visuality and realism of Bacon's paintings depends on the aesthetic style, the way of showing, of making visible something that is not so visible or that is not so noticed in the reality. It is the visual rhetoric of showing.

When referring to the uses of appropriate means for good and necessary results and uses of inappropriate means for illicit and immoral results, it is implicit Plato's two types of rhetoric: a "good rhetoric" (as a psychagogy) guiding people for desirable ends of life, in Plato's *Phaedrus* (1997, 261a); and a "bad rhetoric" (the sophist rhetoric) that seduces and deceives, which is independent of the truth, in Plato's *Gorgias* (2004, 452e). Rhetoric (from the Greek *retoriké*, the art of discourse) is traditionally understood as the ability to persuade or motivate audiences. Rhetoric is a capacity that ensures persuasion, the *Pheitó*, the control over the receivers.

In Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric* (2004, 1355b), the ultimate end and virtuous use of rhetoric is the careful and conscientious use for good purposes, i.e. it is "the ability to discover what is appropriate in each case in order to persuade". As Barthes (1988, p. 11) recognizes, "the world is incredibly full of old rhetoric".

Bacon's visual art is rhetorical in a "good way"; it highlights and clarifies what happens in the world, so that it is more easily understood, despite paradoxically resorting to the distortion of the figures. Bacon's images are enhanced by the visual rhetoric to express messages that reality cannot express. It is a discourse and a peculiar production of meanings. Therefore, Bacon's visual art is a *logopoiesis* and it argues more than it just shows. This is what Barthes (1977, p. 49) calls the rhetoric of the image. As a *logopoiesis*, Bacon's visual art is the praxis of the *logos*, it is *poiesis*, an action that transforms reality through a dialectical unit called *logopoiesis*, a way of producing and using signs as elements of representation. The concept of *logopoiesis* indicates a process of producing meaning and thought through a signification device like visual art, i.e. a poetic form of thought production.

The image-sensation is different from the image-representation. A logic of sensation is antagonistic to a mimetic representation. Within a mimetic representation, signs reproduce the forms (features) of reality (objects, things, etc.). An immediate presentation has no mediation, unlike the representation itself. Any representation follows the semantic transitivity *aliquid pro aliquo* (Eco, 1986, p. 213), i.e. any representation represents, transmits, conveys something else beyond itself. What is represented is always virtual, mental. The meaning of the sign is intangible.

Bacon's visual art is a way to produce images and sensations that make visible the excesses and forces of representation. It allows us to understand more about reality than the reality itself. Bacon's visual signs force the thought in an involuntary, unconscious, and transcendental way. This way shows the violence of the signs on thought, which is the genesis of the act of thinking (Deleuze, 1968, pp. 204-206).

Signs are stimuli, they are perceptible and sensible, but also intelligible. For that reason, they provoke reactions. The sensible is what can be felt and perceive. In Bacon's visual signs, it is the intensity of the signs. If the act of thinking is provoked when the thought is stimulated by signs, this is an inevitable and necessary process of semiosis. According to Deleuze (1968, p. 305; 2014, p. 15), the sign forces us to think; this is the violence of the sign in provoking the act of thinking as a possibility of creation. The virtual (potential) is extended to the very thought that signs propose, which justifies Ricoeur's (1959, p. 66) thesis that symbols give rise to thinking.

### 6. BACON'S EXAMPLES OF A VISUAL RHETORIC OF PATHOS

Bacon's *Three Studies for Pictures at the Base of a Crucifixion* (1944) corresponds to the expression of an excessive violence and feeling of horror. The three figures (each one in his painting) are united. This work represents an indefinite and inhuman violence occurred in an invisible space and at a time outside the limits of the picture (Ficacci, 2007, p. 13). This triptych is coherent in forms and colours (orange colour scattered in space, causing a sensation of blindness, and making space perceived more at the psychic level than logical) disturbing the spectator and imprinting the motive (the horror). The spectator is violently affected by this composition of shapes and colours, states Ficacci (2007, p. 13).

The deformation of the three figures makes an ambiguous and enigmatic painting. The meanings are not explicit. This triptych corresponds to the lacerating and the incomprehensible expression of a cry, insofar as Bacon's painting is not a medium to imitate the apparent reality; it is an independent and an artificial act emerging from the most intimate and instinctual human experience and need. Furthermore, Bacon's images penetrate at the faster and more intuitive level of the mind (Ficacci 2007, p. 16). This level is that of sensation, considering they (the *pathos*) are more deeply rooted and precede logical rationality (the *logos*).

The *pathos* in Bacon's paintings revel the unconscious and individual human existence. The deformed figures of *Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion* are traumatic expressions of horror that have origin in the deepest feelings of human existence. The true subject of visual representation is the expression of horror, which is superior to any specific transitory cause (Ficacci 2007, p. 18). Bacon conveys the most universal and transcendent expression of horror experience through the expressive force of his painting. The implicit expression of the figures demonstrates the most essential of human nature and experience.

In another example, Bacon's *Study of a Baboon* (1953) explores a sharper and clearer level of violence in the image. This painting shows a rude and grotesque figure with monstrous proportions. The *pathos* is more excited due to the structural components of the work of art than to the figurative details. Bacon seeks to stimulate the sensation of existence in painting, transcending the normal state of human existence and experience and creating another hypersensitivity and the transcendental state.

### CONCLUSIONS

This article questions and argues Bacon's paintings. The main idea supported is that Bacon's paintings compose a visual rhetoric regarding the sensations, feelings, and perceptions of the receiver of the images, the public. The perspective is on the decoding, but it is dependent of the encoding.

Bacon's art corresponds to a kind of rhetoric of sensations centred on the effects of visual signs on the spectators/viewers. The perspective of this article is that the *pathos* is something perceptive and sensitive that happens in the spectators/viewers; it is driven, incited, provoked by the images that Bacon creates. The *pathos* is indistinctly caused by the intentional and strategic use of Bacon's visual language.

Bacon's paintings have "additional information", in Eco's (1986, p. 158) lexicon. It is due to the ambiguity of the images. Is it the real what the images suggest? What the signs refer to? The reference links the sign (which triggers the process of representation or signification) to its referent (what the sign represents or replaces) according to Ogden and Richards (1923, p. 11). The reference is the indirect relation between the sign and what it means. If "language itself is a duplicate, a shadow-soul, of the whole structure of reality" (Ogden & Richards 1923, p. 31), the referentiality implies relations between thought, words and things or objects (reality).

Bacon creates images that puncture not necessarily through a dramatic and abstract force. According to Ficacci (2007, p. 7), these images mean, on the contrary, the hidden and unrepresentable sense of individualism and intimate existence. They represent the sense of our existence, which results in an expression of violence and tragedy. It is a sense transformed into an immanent and disturbing reality, which is more real than any real situation. The factual reality of human life becomes an apparition. Only through the practice of painting it can become a flagrant and actual value (Ficacci, 2007, p. 7). The subjectivity of human existential experience reaches the deep sensibilities of the spectator. Bacon's images are motivated by the real experience of empirical life, and the reality of past events is resolved in the reality of the artistic action (Ficacci, 2007, p. 7).

Rhetorically speaking, Bacon's images-sensations force sensations and thoughts to a transcendental experience as it is a new way of feeling and thinking. Bacon's images-sensations evoke and actualize reality, transforming the immanent experience into a transcendental one. Reality transcends the immanence.

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